Vagrants, Criminals and the Constitution by McClure, George M.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 40 Issue 6 Article 2 
April 2021 
Vagrants, Criminals and the Constitution 
George M. McClure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
George M. McClure, Vagrants, Criminals and the Constitution, 40 Denv. L. Ctr. J. 314 (1963). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
VAGRANTS, CRIMINALS AND THE CONSTITUTION
By GEORGE M. MCCLURE*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Vagrancy," said the Colorado Supreme Court in Handler v.
City and County of Denver,' "is a present condition or status."-
2
"Vagrancy is the principal crime in which the offense consists of
being a certain kind of person rather than in having done or failed to
do certain acts. Other crimes of this nature include being a common
drunkard, common prostitute, common thief, tramp or disorderly
person."
'4
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas:
The crime of vagrancy was born in the breakup of
the feudal system. The vagrant was the runaway serf.
And with that as the start it evolved so that it was
aimed at a host of different but related things: begging,
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, prostitution, lewdness,
narcotics peddling, etc.
4
This evolution produced a common-law notion as to what
constituted vagrancy. "At common-law a vagrant [was] an idle
person who [was] without visible means of support and who,
although able to work, [refused] to do so." 5 "These provisions
[relating to tramps and vagrants] rest upon the economic truth
that industry is necessary for the preservation of society, and that
he who, being able to work, and not able otherwise to support
himself, deliberately plans to exist by the labor of others, is an
enemy to society and to the commonwealth.6
In its classic sense, therefore, vagrancy encompassed the ele-
ments of idleness, instability, a refusal to work, and a propensity
to wander or roam. If one were dealing with individuals whose
only "offense" was that they fit the above description, some perti-
nent questions might be: Do we want to label persons in the above
category "criminal"? What "crime" have they committed? Even if
we label them "criminal," do we want to impose criminal sanctions
upon them? Does the imposition of criminal sanctions serve any
useful purpose, to them or to society? If we do not want to label
them criminal or impose criminal sanction, are there other and
perhaps better methods of controlling their conduct while at the
same time safeguarding society from whatever threat they pose
to it? Some answers will be tentatively proposed later in this article.
Unfortunately the problem is made exceedingly more difficult
because:
Today we find that, as defined under the common-law,
vagrancy has been largely abandoned in favor of new
definitions of the offense by our statutes. Such en-
actments, being the exercise of the police power, are
* Associate in the Denver firm of Yegge, Hall and Shulenburg.
1 102 Colo. 53, 77 P.2d 132 (1938).
2 Id. at 58, 77 P.2d at 135.
3 Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203 (1953).
4 Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 6 (1960).
5 Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 609 (1956).
6 State v. Hogan, .63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (1900).
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generally looked upon as regulatory measures to pre-
vent crime rather than as ordinary criminal laws which
prohibit and punish certain acts as crimes .... 7
In essence "the common law offense of vagrancy . . . has been
[significantly] enlarged by statute." The authors of an interesting
and thought-provoking note appearing in the New York University
Law Review analyzed and compared existing vagrancy statutes,
and derived thirty American definitions of vagrancy.!' It is evident
from this survey that the legislatures, or city councils in the case of
ordinances, have taken a whole series of petty acts or events and
authoritatively stated that not only is one who has engaged in the
7 People v. Belcastro, 358 1l. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934).
8 State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 295, 12 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1943).
9 See Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102, 104-06 (1962). The definitions are:
I. The Common-Law Vagrant: ....
2. The Healthy Beggar: An idle or dissolute person, physically able to work, who begs or
subsists on charity . . . .
3. The Loiterer: . . . .
4. The Unauthorized Lodger: . . ..
5. The Night Walker: An idle or dissolute person who roams about at late or unusual
hours and is unable to account for his presence .. . .
6. The Dissolute Misspender of Time: . .. .
7. The Associate of Known Thieves: .. . .
8. The Known Criminal: ....
9. The Common Prostitute: . ..
10. The Common Prostitute in Public-.
11. The Keeper of a House of Prostitution: . . .
12. The Inhabitant of a House of Prostitution: .. ...
13. The Dependent of a Prostitute: . ..
14. The Solicitor: .. ..
15. The Habitual Associate of Prostitutes: . . ..
16. The Common Gambler: .. ...
17. The Common Drunkard: . ....
18. The Drug Addict: . . . .
19. The Lewd or Lascivious Person: .. . .
20. The Juvenile Vagrant: . . .
21. The Adult Dependent: An idle or dissolute person who is able to work but lives upon
the earnings of a minor child.
22. The Non-Supporter: An idle or dissolute person who, due to his idleness, fails to support
his dependents, leaving them wards or potential wards of charity or the state.
23. The Attorney's Copper: .. . .
24. The Charlatan: A person who subsists by obtaining money through trick or device (in-
cludes and often listed merely as fortune tellers).
25. The Window Peeper.
26. The Common Brawler.
27. The Trader in Stolen Property: . . .
28. The Expelled Non-Resident: . . ..
29. The Possessor of Burglar Tools: . ....
30. The 'Elastic Clause': One who is engaged in practicing any unlawful calling whatever.
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proscribed activity guilty of a substantive offense (as is usually
the case) but, in addition, repetitions of such conduct make him a
vagrant, and amenable to an alternative charge.
The result of the statutory additions to the common-law con-
cept of vagrancy is that:
The idea conveyed by the word "vagrant" or "vag-
rancy" [has] connected with it, and as a part of it, not
only an idle person, but one whose business, pursuit, or
occupation, or want of it, [is] vicious to society ....
.... [the] idea conveyed and intended to be conveyed
thereby was and is as to the status, course of conduct,
business, pursuit, or occupation of such persons who are
denounced as vagrants and proven by showing many
specific acts which make up their general course of
conduct . . . in contradistinction to their committing
a specific act. The idea further is that such persons are
denominated vagrants because their course of conduct,
status . . . is habitual in its nature.'
Apparantly, our society is attempting to punish under its
criminal laws two types of offense. On the one hand, specific acts
such as drunkenness or prostitution, capable of proof in each in-
stance, are made punishable as an isolated illegal activity and
treated as separate items in the statutes or municipal codes; on
the other hand, either in addition to, or as an alternative charge
to the specific substantive offense, repeated violations or a course
of conduct which includes a repetition of the proscribed activity
can, by authority of vagrancy legislation, place an individual in the
class of persons bearing the appellation "vagrant." More import-
antly, certain activity or conduct having no substantive relation-
ship to any specific offense, such as "night walking," have been
added legislatively to the concept of vagrancy, which raises this
question: Can the legislature or city council denounce as a crime
membership in a class where one becomes a member of the class
by exhibiting a course of conduct deemed undesirable but not
related to any specific statutory offense, without infringing upon
certain constitutional guarantees?
II. VAGRANCY LAWS IN COLORADO
Vagrancy law exists in Colorado by virtue of a state statute,'
but more importantly," ' through another statute,'3 the actual auth-
ority to control vagrants is delegated to the cities. For reference to
10 Parshall v. State, 138 S.W. 759, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-8-20 (1953): Any person able to work and support himself in some
honest and respectable calling, who shall be found loitering or strolling about, frequenting public
places, or where liquor is sold, begging or leading an idle, immoral or profligate course of life,
or not having any visible means of support, shall be deemed a vagrant, and may be arrested and
brought before any justice of the peace. Such justice of the peace shall examine such person and
hear testimony in relation to such person, and if satisfied that such person is a vagrant, may impose
a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars, or imprison such person
in the county joil not less than ten nor more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprison-
ment . ...
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-8-21 (1953): A person accused of the crime of vagrancy, or of the via.
lotion of an ordinance against vagrancy, shall have, except in police courts, the right to a trial by
jury.
12 In Colorado, the vast majority of vagrancy cases arise in home-rule cities under municipal
ordinances, therefore, no analysis of the Colorado statute, supra note 11, will be attempted.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1 (1953): The governing bodies in cities and towns shall have the
following powers: . . . (57) - To restrain and punish vagrants, mendicants, and prostitutes.
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a specific enactment, the Denver Ordinance, 14 typical of many city
ordinances throughout the country, is set out marginally herein.15
The first point to consider in analyzing this ordinance is that
it makes it unlawful "for any person to have the status or condition
of or to be a vagrant." Then the ordinance defines thirteen different
ways in which one may either attain the status or be a vagrant.
In other words, one is a vagrant in Denver who exhibits the char-
acteristics denounced in sections 824.1-1, .1-2, .1-3, .1-4, .1-5, .1-7, .1-8,
.1-9, .1-10, and .1-11, all without any regard to whether or not the
proscribed conduct is a habitual mode of life or course of conduct!
14 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 824 et. seq. (1958); Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code
§ 011.10 (1958): [Any person . . . who shall be convicted of a violation of any such section shall
for each offense, be fined in a sum not more than $300 or imprisoned not to exceed 90 days or
both so fined and imorisoned.
15 Id. § 824. Vagrancy, Loitering and Unlawful Congregation.
.1. Vagrancy. It shall be unlawful for any person to have the status or condition or to
be a vagrant in the City and County of Denver. The following persons shall be deemed
vagrants:
.1-1. Any aerson having no lawful means of employment and having no lawful means
of support realized solely from lawful occupations or sources; or, any person who lives idly
and without visible means of support.
.1-2. Any person found loitering or strolling in, about, or upon any street, lane, avenue,
alley, or any other public way or public place, or at any public gathering or assembly, or
in or around any store, shop, or business or commercial establishment, or on any private
property or place without lawful business and conducting himself in a lewd, wanton or
lascivious manner in speech or behavior.
.1-3. Any person upon whose person or in whose possession shall be found any instru-
ment, tool, or other implement for picking locks or pockets, or any implement that is usually
employed or that reasonably may be inferred is designed to be employed in the commission
of any felony, misdemeanor or the violation of any ordinance, who shall fail to account
satisfactorily for the possession of the same.
.1-4. Any person wandering abroad and occupying, lodging, or sleeping in any vacant
or unoccupied barn, garage, shed, shop, or other building or structure, or in any automobile,
truck, railroad car, or other vehcle, wi hout owning same or without permission of the owner
or person entitled to the possession of the same, or sleeping in any vacant lot during the
hours of darkness and not giving a satisfactory account of himself.
.1-5. Any person wandering abroad and begging; or any person who goes about from
door to door of private homes or commercial and business establishments, or places himself
in or upon any public way or public place to beg or receive alms for himself.
.1-6. Any person who is a common drunkard, found in any place where intoxicating
liquors are sold or kept for sale.
.1-7. Any person who wanders about the streets, alleys, or other public ways or places,
or who is found abroad at late and unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful
business and not giving a satisfactory account of himself.
.1-8. Any person who shall engage in any fraudulent scheme, device, or trick to obtain
money or other valuable thing from others; or any person who aids or assists such trick, device
or scheme.
.1-9. Any person who asks or receives any compensation, gratuity, or reward for prac-
ticing fortune telling, palmistry, or clairvoyance; provided, however, that the provisions of
this subsection as it relates to clairvoyance shall not be cpplicable to bona fide participation
in religious worship of any legally constituted religious body which has been exempted by
the United States Treasury Department under the Internal Revenue Code from paying federal
income tax.
.1-10. Any person who keeps a place where lost or stolen property is concealed.
.1-11. Any person who shall store, keep, maintain, exhibit, operate, control, supervise,
possess, or use any gambling table or device, or who shall assist at, engage in, or aid or
participate in the use of any gambling table or gambling device or gambling activity, or
who travels about from place to place, for the purpose of gambling, or who induces, entices,
or persuades or attempts to induce, entice, or persuade any other person to engage in any
gambl:ng activity.
.1-11A. Any prostitute who shall be found loitering or strolling in, about, or upon any
way, place, or building, either public or private, accosting or soliciting any other person or
persons; and for the purposes of this subsection or subdivision the conviction of any person
within two years of prostitution, or of the offering or receiving of the body for sexual inter-
course or other physical sexual activity for hire, or of the indiscriminate or promiscuous offering
or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse or other physical sexual activity without hire,
shall be and constitute prima facie evidence that such person is a prostitute.
.1-11B. Any pimp, panderer, or procurer who shall be found loitering or strolling in,
about, or upon any way, place or building, either public or private, accosting or soliciting
any other person or persons; and for the purposes of this subsection or subdivision the con-
viction of any person within two years of securing or offering to secure another for the pur-
pose of committing a lewd act or for the purpose of offering or receiving the body for sexual
intercourse or other sexual activity either for hire or indiscriminately or promiscuously without
hire, shall be and constitute prima facie evidence that such person is a pimp, panderer, or
procurer.
.1-12. In the prosecution of any person charged with violating section .1-6. hereof, it
shall be sufficient to show three (3) prior convictions for drunkenness during the next previous
six months,
.2. Loitering, and other acts in and about schools.
.3. Loitering Prohibited.
.4. Unlawful Congregation.
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One attains the status of being a vagrant, i.e., exhibits character-
istics which indicate a habitual way of life, under sections 824 .1-6
(incorporating .1-12), .1-11A, and .1-11B. That is to say, one is a
"common drunk" who has three prior convictions for drunkenness
during the next previous six months; one is a "prostitute" who has
a previous conviction for prostitution, etc. within two years; one
is a "pimp" who has a conviction for securing, etc. within two
years; but, in addition to being one of the above, the individual is
also a vagrant.
The second point which should be considered in analyzing this
ordinance is that of the thirteen ways in which one becomes a
vagrant seven of them are denounced as specific offenses elsewhere
in th Code. 16 Of these seven, four fall in the category discussed above
whereby one is a vagrant merely by exhibiting the proscribed
characteristics. The other three fall into the second category where-
by one must suffer prior convictions for a substantive offense be-
fore attaining the status of vagrant. The six remaining ways in
which one is deemed a vagrant have no relationship to any specific
offense denounced elsewhere in the ordinances.
In essence, then, the Denver Code announces that it is a crime,
complete within itself, to be a vagrant. The Code thereby estab-
lishs a class of persons with the appellation vagrant, and describes
what conduct or activity will serve to bring a person within the
classification. Once within the ambit of the class, regardless of
whether he occupies that position because of prior convictions of
specific offenses, or only once indulged in the proscribed conduct,
he is subject to the penalty prescribed by law.'-
The objection to this type of enactment is that historically
the courts have interpreted vagrancy itself as a status. That is to
say, one becomes a "common drunk" by having a record showing
three prior convictions for drunkenness within the previous six
months. This in itself is a status or class, but it is included within
a larger status or class denominated as vagrant. It is for being a
vagrant, not a "common drunk," that an individual suffers punish-
ment. What constitutes the status of vagrancy has proved to be an
illusive concept, and whether or not the doing of a single act is
16Compare § 824.1-2 with § 842 (Disturbance and Noise); § 824.1-3 with § 846.11 (Unlawful
to Possess Burglar's Tools); § 824.1-8 with § 850.6-3 (False Pretenes); § 824.1-11 with § 821 (Offenses
involving Gambling); § 824.1-6 with § 822 (Intoxication); § 824.1-11A with § 823 (Offenses Relating
to Sex); § 824.1-11B with § 823 (Offenses Relating to Sex).
17 Supra note 14.
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sufficient to constitute one a vagrant has caused trouble for many
courts. In People v. Brandt,18 the defendant was convicted of being
a common prostitute. The only evidence was the testimony of
one witness who admitted an act of illicit intercourse with the
appellant. The court, in reversing the conviction because one act
of intercourse did not establish the appellant as a common
prostitute, said:
[T]here is implicit in the crime of vagrancy the
element of a course of conduct as contradistinguished
from isolated acts. . . . In some circumstances . . .. a
single act . . . may be sufficient to establish that the
person committing it has, for example, acquired the
status of a dissolute or lewd individual and is liable to
conviction for vagrancy; but this situation arises only
in the event that the single act of lewdness constituting
the violation is of such a nature that it reasonably jus-
tifies the inference that no one not of a lewd or dis-
solute character would do "such an act even once ....
[T] he courts have held uniformly that one who is a
vagrant has become such by repetition of the same
conduct-even though in some cases the repetition may
be inferred from a single act.
If our own legislature had intended that one act of
illicit intercourse made the offender a lewd and dis-
solute person and hence guilty of vagrancy, it would
have said so in a subdivision leaving no room for
doubt. 19
The same court in an earlier case 20 said:
Conceding that vagrancy is chronic rather than .acute
as stated in People v. Craig2' .... .yet we think the
existence of such a chronic condition may be ascer-
tained from a single examination, if the characteristic
reactions of that condition be found present. There are
many acts which, if committed repeatedly over a
period of time, would be evidence of the species of
vagrancy here charged, but which are of such doubtful
impact, because they might proceed from other courses
than a lewd or dissolute character, that a single in-
stance would afford no certain foundation for the in-
ference that the actor is a person of such character.
There are, however, other acts which are of such nature
as reasonably to justify an inference that no one not
of lewd or dissolute character would do such an act
even once. If the evidence shows a single act of the
kind last mentioned, the question as to the inference to
be drawn therefrom is one for the trial court . ... 2
It would seem from the above quotations that normally the
doing of a single act will not justify a vagrancy conviction unless
1 306 P.2d 1069 (Cal. Super. 1956).
19 Id. at 1071.
20 People v. Scott. 113 Cal. App. (Supp.) 778, 296 Pac. 601 (1931).
21 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907). "Vagrancy differs from most other offenses in the
fact that it is chronic rather than acute: that it continues after it is complete, and hereby subjects
the offender to arrest at any time before he reforms."
22 Supra note 20, 296 Pac. at 603.
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the logical inference which can be drawn from the doing of that
act is that it is indicative of a mode of life denounced as vagrant.
It is extremely problematical whether that inference is actually
drawn by trial courts in convicting under certain sections of the
Denver Ordinance. It is even more problematical whether certain
of the sections are aimed at vagrants at all. Before attempting a
discussion of that point, it would serve a useful purpose to examine
the rationale behind vagrancy-type laws.
III. THE RATIONALE OF VAGRANCY-TYPE LAWS
The justification for vagrancy laws which receives the most
widespread attention is crime prevention.23 This concept received
articulation in District of Columbia v. Hunt,24 where the court said:
A vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of
the statute[s] is to prevent crimes which may likely
flow from his mode of life. Hence the statute[s]
Idenounce] and [make] punishable being in a condi-
tion of vagrancy rather than . . . the particulars of
conduct enumerated in the statute[s] as evidencing
or characterizing such condition.
2 5
Another court's opinion was that "they [vagrancy statutes]
are designed to prevent crime . . . .,,26 Thus "the view persists
in this country that these wanderers are a 'potential menace to
the community' and must be punished.
'27
Assuming that "vagrancy laws are designed as police regulations
to prevent rather than to punish criminal acts,"2S to what purposes
are the vagrancy statutes used? 9
The vagrancy concept has been used: To harass reputed crim-
inals;30 to justify an arrest otherwise illegal; 31 to arrest on sus-
picion; -32 to arrest for investigation;33 to round up a certain class
of known criminals, such as prostitutes;34 and to validate an other-
wise illegal search.3 5 Significant questions arise when one considers
these uses which, at best, are marginal instruments in a constitution-
ally limited system of police power.
Caleb Foote, in practically the only statistical survey ever
undertaken on the uses of vagrancy laws, states that:
The wide scope of .. .policy objectives illustrates the
important place of vagrancy-type law in our criminal
administration. The acts which are made punishable
are petty in terms of social dangerousness, but the
chief significance of this branch of the criminal law
lies in its quantitative impact and administrative use-
23 Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102 (1962).
24 163 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"25 Id. at 835-6.
26 Beail v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765, 767 (Municipal Ct. D.C. 1951).
27 Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 11 (1960).
2 Note, An Over-Expanded Application of Vagrancy Statutes, 1961 Wash. U.L.Q. 425, 428 (1961).
29 The compilation used herein is taken from the Note, supra note 28, at 425.
30 See Hall, The Low of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev.
345, 369 (1936); Locey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203,
1218 (1953).
31 See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 614 (1956).
32 Douglas, supra note 27, at 13.
33 Douglas, supra note 27, at 14; Hall, supra note 30, at 369; Lacey, supra note 30, at 1218.
34 Douglas, supra note 27, at 8.
35 Foote, supro note 31, at 615.
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fulnessY6 Administratively, vagrancy-type statutes are
regarded as essential criminal preventatives, providing
a residual police power to facilitate the arrest, in-
vestigation, and incarceration of suspicious persons.
When suspects can be arrested for nothing else, it is
often possible to "go and vag them.
3 7
This policy exists because "municipalities often find law en-
forcement seriously hampered by traditional restrictions on the
power to arrest without a warrant."s If the statutes were cor-
rectly construed and applied, such status elements (inherent in the
whole vagrancy concept, even by judical interpretation) would
seriously interfere with what now is one of vagrancy's most
convenient aspects from a police standpoint, the authority to arrest
without a warrant ... 
That this type of situation should exist is, in large part, be-
cause "procedural due process does not penetrate to the world
inhabited by the 'bums' . . . [but] what occurs in that world is
certainly relevant to the problem of how far our criminal law
administration should relax constitutional and procedural controls
to permit greater administrative police discretion.
40
As Mr. Foote observes:
If vagrancy-law administration.., involves any socially
desirable policy ... it is because its flexibility gives the
police a residual discretionary power to control sus-
picious persons or harass suspected professional crim-
inals. . . . IT]he substitution of harassment for the
more difficult job of obtaining the evidence necessary
to convict criminals of the substantive offenses of
which they are guilty encourages superficial and in-
efficient police work.
41
In a society which prides itself on its civil liberties and equal
justice for all, an honest and sincere attempt must be made to
"try to discover how our system can be designed to dispense justice
to vagabonds as well as to corporate clients.
'"4 2
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
It would appear that "the actual limits of vagrancy are set
not in the statute but by [the] practices of police and magis-
trates. '43 It is necessary then to examine the aspects wherein crimes
of condition differ from crimes of action in order to determine the
relationship of the former to traditional criminal theory. For clarity
the differences may be divided into three categories - procedural,
evidential, and substantive.
44
36l Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
3S Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 Yale L.J.
1351 (1950).
39 Foote, supra note 31, at 629.
40 Id. at 604.
41 Id. at 648.
42' Douglas, supra note 27, at 14.
43 Foote, supra note 31, at 603.
44 The classifications used herein are taken from Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203, 1210-1217 (1953).
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Procedurally a very serious problem is presented as to the
validity of arrests made without a warrant.45 In People v. Craig,46
which was a prosecution for the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon, the police officers attempted to justify their arrest without
a warrant by showing the commission of a misdemeanor (vagrancy)
in their presence. The police admittedly had no other grounds
so they decided to go "and vag them. '4 7 The police officer was
able to testify to past conduct which made the defendants vagrants,
but this seems to emphasize the fact that it is the condition which
is punishable and that the condition is a continuing one "after it
is complete, and thereby subjects the offender to arrest at any
time before he reforms. ' 48 The ramifications of this position become
apparent when one considers that because it is the condition that
is being punished, an individual may be arrested repeatedly with no
new offences involved merely because at some prior time he at-
tained the status of a vagrant. If, as has been said in at least one
case,49 reformation from the proscribed way of life is a bar to
prosecution, it is difficult to perceive how reformation could take
place when the individual is subject to continued arrest.
The evidential problems involve the question whether evidence
of reputation is sufficient to convict, or whether proof of actual
conduct is to be required. Fortunately, "the number of vagrancy
45 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 6 c (1) (a): "At common law . . . it is a general rule that a peace officer
may without a warrant, arrest any person who is committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor
in his presence . . . . [Peace officers are usually accorded the right to arrest without a warrant
vagrants, disorderly persons, and prostitutes when the officers have knowledge that they are such."
(Footnotes omitted.)
46 152 Col. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907).
47 Id. at 47, 91 Pac. at 1000.
48 Ibid.
49 City of San Antonio v. Salvation Army, 127 S.W. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
...................................
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cases upholding the use of testimony as to the reputation of the
defendant is not very large."50 In striking down a statute authorizing
the use of reputation evidence, the Michigan Supreme Court said:
Defendants were denounced by hearsay and convicted
by inference drawn therefrom .... 51 The statute
dignifies into legal proof of guilt evidence of repu-
tation that an accused has offended by engaging in an
illegal [activity]. The Legislature may not declare
reputation prima facie evidence that an accused has
committed a crime without showing that a crime has,
in fact, been committed.5 "'
In People v. Belcastro5 3 the defendant was convicted under a
statute whereby he was reputed to be a habitual violator of the
laws of the state and the United States; he was reputed to be an
associate of reputed habitual violators of the law; and he was re-
puted to carry concealed weapons. In short, the statute attempted
to punish one for what he was reputed to be without regard to
what he actually was in fact. The Illinois Supreme Court said:
With mere guilty intention, divorced from an overt
act or outward manifestation thereof, the law does
not concern itself . . . . Character is what a person
is; reputation is what he is supported to be. If the legis-
lature leaves to administrative officers the determina-
tion of what the law shall be, or to determine what
acts are necessary to effectuate the law, such delegation
of authority is void. 
5 4
Acceptance of the principle that one could be convicted and
punished of any crime merely on the strength of what others say
about him is alien to traditional American concepts of justice and
fair play. To accept this principle is, in the words of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court as long ago as 1881, "to render all the
constitutional safeguards of life, liberty, and property unavail-
ing. ..
In the area of substantive differences, two problems arise:
(1.) The number of acts required to constitute the offense, and,
(2.) Whether the statutory definition prohibits the enumerated
specific crimes or merely defines different ways in which one can
become a vagrant. In some cases, as discussed earlier, single acts
have been sufficient because of the logical inferences to be drawn
therefrom, 6 while in others, several acts are required before the
requisite status is attained. 57 The prevailing attitude towards the
statutory language seems to be that it describes different ways in
which one becomes a vagrant. At least the California case of
People v. Allington58 so holds. The court therein said:
That which has been done is not to declare that it
is unlawful to get drunk, or to prostitute oneself, or
50 Hirsch v. Cincinnati, 29 Ohio C.D. 613 (Ct. App. 1915); World v. State, 50 Md. 49 (1878).
51 People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520, 522 (1933).
52 Id., 250 N.W. at 525.
53 365 III. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
54 Id., 190 N.E. at 303-304.
55 State v. Kartz, 13 R.I. 528, 531 (1881).
56 People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951); People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App.
778, 296 Pac. 601 (1931).
57 E.g., Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code §§ 824.1-6 (including .1-12.), .1-11A, and .1-11B.
58 103 Cal. App. 2d 911, 229 P.2d 495 (1951).
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to peep in another's building, nor have these acts been
declared to be misdemeanors. The punishment pro-
vided by section 647 is not for doing, but for being; for
being a vagrant.59
Perhaps the most significant and surely one of the most
troublesome substantive differences between status criminality
and traditional conduct criminality is the concept of the "harm"
involved. "'The problem of evil' is deeply imbedded in the human
drama, and the proscribed harms have played the major role in
it."'6 0 In the vagrancy concept it is sometimes extremely difficult
to determine what the proscribed "harm" is. "In penal theory, harm
is the focal point between criminal conduct on the one side, and
the punitive sanction, on the other."' '
While the concept of "harm" is an illusive one and there does
not appear to be a definitive statement on what it includes, it
perhaps is sufficient to define "'harm' in terms of deviation from
public attitudes." 62 Before one can accept that definition there must
be at least a basic understanding of the attitudes and mores in
the society, because "harm implies the existence of values, interests
or natural conditions. '63 Many systems of value have been devised
in an attempt to express philosophically what the community or
sociological unit holds in esteem,64 but unfortunately reality does
not always coincide with the philosophical expression. More ex-
plicitly, a community's or an individual's attitudes do not always
coincide with their values. Our society as a whole, for example,
values highly personal freedom and the individual's rights when
viewed in the abstract; but when these concepts are placed in
juxtaposition to certain laws deemed expedient to control the
movement and liberty of a class of individuals, there seems to be
a decided shift in attitude towards a more restrictive application of
the value-system. In short, the community does not extend the
protection of its value system to all members of the community.
Because of the degree and nature of harm involved, the major
substantive offenses such as murder, rape, arson, kidnapping, etc.
do not present a major definitional problem. This is due in large
part to the fact that the values and attitudes of our society admit
that these offenses represent serious harms. The dilemma arises at
the other end of the spectrum wherein such crimes as attempts,
conspiracies, and vagrancy are punished, not because of what the
actor actually did, but because of what he intended and the prob-
ability of greater harm arising out of his conduct. Thus the com-
munity fears, or at least thinks it does, that within the vagrancy
concept there exists "a dangerous condition in which the probability
of still greater harm is substantially increased."65 If it can be
demonstrated that the conduct enumerated as vagrant does lead
to substantially greater harms, then perhaps society has a self-
protective interest in punishing in its inception the conduct which
leads to such greater harm.
59 Id. at 919, 229 P.2d at 500.
60 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 213 (2d ed. 1960).
61 ibid.
62 Hall, op. cit. supra note 60, at 214.
63 Id. at 215.
64 For a representative collection see Hall, op. cit. supra note 60, at 215-216.
65 Id. at 218.
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It is this conflict about when and for what harm we should
inflict punitive sanctions that has caused a division in approaches
to the problem. The conflict is exemplified by such statements as:
The manifest purpose of this [vagrancy] legislation is
to check evil in its beginning, and thus to insure the
public safety. The statute is not arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. It provides for the apprehension and punish-
ment of a class that- menaces the security of persons
and property . . . . Such offenses are a species of
nuisance. It is the undoubted function of the state to
apprehend those who would violate laws ordained to
protect the persons and property of citizens, and who
are seeking the opportunity to do so .... To challenge
the right of the state to prevent the commission of such
crimes by legislation of this character is to challenge
its power to denounce and punish the crime itself.6
The same court, five years later, further elucidated that
statement by saying:
The principle exemplified in the case of Levine v.
State, supra, and the vagrancy statutes, presupposes a
criminal status, not due to the perpetration of a specific
offense presently or in the past, -but rather by reason
of an intent, sufficiently manifested by overt acts, to
commit offenses in futuro inimical to the general public
interest .... These statutes are generally sustained as
in the nature of a police regulation to prevent crime,
rather than the punishment of a specific overt act
branded as criminal. 6 7 [Emphasis added.]
The above statements are indicative of the point of view which
attempts to justify the imposition of sanctions because of the po-
tential menace of crimes in futuro. The opposite point of view is
exemplified by the following statement.
[I]t is . . . difficult to reconcile with traditional
American law the jailing of persons by the courts
because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes.
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this
country and so fraught with danger of excesses and
injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a dis-
cretionary judicial technique .... 6s
It is evident that in the field of criminal attempts, conspiracies,
solicitations, and vagrancy it is the avowed policy of the law to
punish something short of the ultimate harm involved. It would
appear, however, that there may be a substantial difference be-
tween the first three offenses and vagrancy. Attempts, conspiracies
and solicitations bear a specific relationship to some substantive
offense such as murder or larceny. That is, in each of them there
is an identifiable future harm involved, and the fact that the crime
falls short of its ultimate goal merely lessens the severity of the
punishment. In the vagrancy context, however, the anticipated
future harm may not be identifiable. There may be no direct re-
66 Levine v. State, 110 N.J.L. 467, 166 Ati. 300, 302 (1933).
67 State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 Ati. 360, 363 (1938).
68 Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950).
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lationship between the conduct or status denounced as a substantive
offense and any identifiable future specific harm. Yet the vagrant
is denounced and the laws which punish him justified because he
is a future probable criminal; what form his future criminality may
take is uncertain, but under the guise of police regulations he may
be punished now.
A. Due Process of Law
The vagueness of the present or future harm involved, and
the manifold borderline uses to which the police put this type of
legislation often results in attacks on its constitutionality. Vagrancy,
if the concept is to survive, should find its place within the tradi-
tional framework of accepted criminal theory.
Many of the attacks on the constitutionality of vagrancy legis-
lation have been based upon the void-for-vagueness argument, and
upon the fact that the legislation is unduly restrictive of personal
liberty. Both arguments stem from the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment.6 9 In City of St. Louis v. Gloner,70 which was
a prosecution under the Municipal Code of St. Louis for unlaw-
fully standing on the street corner in the day or night time, the
court said:
While the City has the undoubted right, under its
charter, to regulate the use of its streets, it has no
right to do so in a way that interferes with the personal
liberty of the citizen as guaranteed to him by our
Constitution and laws . . . .The defendant had the
unquestioned right to go where he pleased, and to
stop and remain upon the corner of any street that he
might desire, so long as he conducted himself in a
decent and orderly manner, disturbing no one, nor in-
terfering with any one's right to the use of the street.7 1
The ordinance was held unconstitutional and invalid because it
infringed upon the right of personal liberty, and was unreasonable
and oppressive.
In Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha,72 the question was the
validity of a statute which provided: "[A] ny person who shall
09 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the law."
70 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).
71 Id., 109 S.W. at 32.
72 47 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931).
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habitually loaf, loiter, and/or idle upon any public street or high-
way or in any public place shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
punished as therein provided. ' 73 The court pointed out:
In any view we take of it, the act trenches upon the
inalienable rights of the citizen to do what he will and
when he will, so long as his course of conduct is not
inimicable to himself or to the general public of which
he is a part.
74
In City of Cleveland v. Baker,75 an ordinance 76 was called into
question and the court observed:
[T]his ordinance grants to the police force of the
city the absolute discretion of preventing any gather-
ing or congregation of persons and to prevent them
to occupy the sidewalks and to arrest anyone found in
violation ....
A municipal ordinance . . . to be valid, must not be
arbitrary, discriminating, carpricious or unreasonable
and must bear a real and substantial relation to the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public.
77
One of the most widely known cases involving status criminal-
ity is the Lanzetta case.78 A New Jersey statute purported to make
criminal a class of persons who fit the following description:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two
or more persons, who has been convicted at least
three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime in this or any other State,
is declared to be a gangster .... 79
In striking down this law as unconstitutional the Supreme
Court said:
The challenged provision condemns no act or omission;
the terms it employs to indicate what it purports to
denounce are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that
it must be condemned as repugnant to the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80
In the main, however, state court opinions have not been receptive
to the void-for-vagueness or infringement of liberty arguments in
vagrancy appeals.81
Language in the vagrancy laws that has been most subject to
attack involves the "failure to give a satisfactory explanation" or
"failure to give a good account" clauses. 82 Uncertainty exists
73 Hawaii Sess. Laws 1929, art. 256, § 1.
74 Supra note 72, at 173.
75 83 Ohio L. Abs. 502, 167 N.E.2d 119 (1960).
76City of Cleveland Ordinance § 13.0941: 'It shall be unlawful for persons having no occupa-
tion or business at the places hereinafter named, to congregate upon or occupy the sidewalks, or
at the corners of any street of the city or in such manner as to occupy the sidewalks in front of
any dwelling or place of business in the city, or in such manner as to occupy the sidewalks in
Monumental Park or other public parks of the city, or in front of any place of worship or amuse-
ment ... ."
77 Supra note 75, at 121; accord, Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 319, 91 N.E.2d 666
(1950).
78 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
79 New Jersey Laws, 1934, ch. 155, § 4.
80 Supra note 78, at 458.
81 See Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102, 124 (1962), and cases cited therein.
82 E.g., Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code § 824.1-7: "Any person who wanders about the streets,
alleys, or other public ways or places, or who is found abroad at late and unusual hours in the
night without any visible or lawful business and not giving a satisfactory account of himself."
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whether those clauses are merely procedural steps which the
officer must follow or whether they are substantive elements of
the offense.
In People v. Bell,"3 the respondents were convicted under an
ordinance reading, "Any person who loiters about any . . . station
* . . of a railroad, . . . and who is unable to give a satisfatcory ex-
planation of his presence is guilty of an offense." ' In dealing with
that clause the court said:
We do not agree with the contention of the District
Attorney that this clause [and who is unable to give
satisfactory explanation of his presence I means that
any person found on the premises is required to give
an explanation which satisfies any individual police
officer by whom he is accosted. If that were true,
the statute would furnish no standard of conduct which
could be known in advance, and it would be void for
uncertainty ....
These words . . . neither furnish a basis for conviction
standing by themselves, nor do they add any substan-
tive element of the offense . . . . This is not a sub-
stantive factor in what constitutes the offense, but is
merely a procedural condition which has to be ful-
filled if a prosecution is to succeed.,
Desmond, J., in a concurring opinion, took issue with the above
pronouncement, saying:
One is guilty of an offense, says the statute, who
"loiters" about a railroad station, and "who is unable
to give satisfactory explanation of his presence." The
reference to "satisfactory explanation" is an essential
part of this criminal statute, and cannot be deleted
therefrom by the courts. It follows that, if the "satis-
factory explanation" provision lacks sufficient clarity
for reasonable application, the whole statute is bad.
We find no reasonably clear meaning for the language:
"unable to give satisfactory explanation of his pres-
ence." When is the explanation to be given, and to
whom? Who is to be satisfied? Is the offense complete
when the police officer or a railroad employee re-
jects the explanation proffered for an otherwise in-
nocent act? Or, worse still, is the adequacy of the
explanation to await determination at a trial, with all
the intervening trouble, annoyance and expense to
the defendant? A statute which leaves such questions
open falls below rational standards.,
In an extremely close decision, State v. Grenz,8 7 the defendant
was caught almost in the act of stealing chickens and was charged
with vagrancy under a statute providing that: "Every . . . . (8)
person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of
the night without any visible or lawful business; . . . Is a vagrant,
83 306 N. Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
84 Ibid.
85 Id., 115 N.E.2d ot 823.
86 Id. at 824.
87 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1947). Five judges for conviction, four for dismissal.
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and shall be punished .... ",8 While the "failure to give a good
account" clause does not appear in the statute, the arresting officer
had asked the defendant what he was doing and upon his failure
to satisfactorily account, the arrest was made. The majority opinion
stated:
The gist of the offense in the instant case is that
the circumstances under which appellant was ap-
prehended were consistent with the hypothesis that
he was about to commit a crime, and were inconsistent
with any reasonable hypothesis that he had any lawful
or visible business at the time and place of his appre-
hension. This is the very end which the statute was
designed to remedy, and it is difficult to conceive of
a clearer case calling for its application!s !"
Here is judicial recognition of the police use of vagrancy as a
preventative measure with absolutely no correlation between the
crime sought to be prevented and the crime of being a vagrant. The
strong minority position in this case was stated by Millard, J.,
who said:
I cannot agree . . . that an enactment which defines a
vagrant as one who wanders about the streets at late
or unusual hours of the night, unless such person is
engaged in a visible or lawful business, is a valid
exercise of the police power ....
There can be no such thing as an attempt to at-
tempt to commit a crime ....
Have we traveled so far along the highway of regi-
mentation that an officious officer may accost a citizen
at any time of the day or night and insist upon that
citizen answering impertinent questions of the of-
ficer?9 o
Simpson, J., concurring with Millard, J., said "the rule adopted
by the majority place the burden of proof of innocence upon the
accused." 91
The Colorado Supreme Court recently had occasion to con-
sider the validity of a section of the Denver Vagrancy Ordinance.Y'
In Dominguez v. City and County of Denver,"" the appellant was
apprehended under circumstances which indicated he might have
been guilty of certain offenses. He was charged, however, with
vagrancy and was convicted. On appeal he raised, inter alia, the
void-for-vagueness argument. The court rested its decision on the
ground that if the ordinance was capable of two constructions, one
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, they would choose
the constitutional one.
In construing the ordinance the court said:
[O]ne may become a vagrant in either of two ways:
(1) Any person who wanders about the streets, alleys
or other public ways or places at late or unusual hours
S8 Ibid.
89 Id., 175 P.2d at 638.
90 Id. at 638-9.
91 Id. at 640.
92 Supro note 82.
93 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961).
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of the night without any visible or lawful business and
not giving a satisfactory account of himself,
or
(2) Any person who is found abroad at late or unusual
hours of the night without any visible or lawful
business, and not giving a satisfactory account of him-
self - is deemed a vagrant
4
It is submitted that the court's interpretation of this ordinance is
only one of several ways it could have been interpreted. Another,
and perhaps more logical, interpretation would be that one becomes
a vagrant in either of two ways:
94 Id. at 240, 363 P.2d at 665.
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(1) Any person who wanders about the streets, alleys,
or other public ways or places ....
This portion of the ordinance clearly defines one category of per-
sons to be deemed vagrants. It attempts to prohibit all "wandering"
at any time, day or night, but "prima facie, mere sauntering or
loitering on a public way is lawful and the right of any man, wo-
man, or child . . . ." The use of the disjunctive:
(2) . . . or who is found abroad at late and unusual
hours in the night without any visible or lawful
business -
suggests the second category of persons to be deemed vagrants. The
ordinance then adds the clause "and not giving a satisfactory
account of himself," which raises the problem discussed above,
whether that clause is a procedural step the officer must follow, or
a substantive part of the offense.
The court chose to read the ordinance making the provisions
"without any visible or lawful business and not giving a satisfactory
account of himself" apply to both categories. There is at least some
doubt as to whether that is the correct interpretation.
Furthermore, the court virtually rewrote the ordinance by
holding that:
[T] here was conduct on the part of Dominguez which
made it proper for the officer to require a satisfactory
exculpatory statement and that the statements given
were not a satisfactory account in view of all the cir-
cumstances9 6
The introduction of this element of "probable cause" to stop and
question an individual is a substantial addition to the ordinance,
and would seem to indicate that in future cases the arresting of-
ficer will have to show a course of conduct by the accused which
gave rise to the inference that his presence on the streets was un-
lawful, otherwise the officer has no right to stop and question
anyone.
The idea of inserting an element which does not appear in the
ordinance is not novel with the Colorado court. In In Re Cregler,9 7
the defendant was convicted under a statute which purported to
punish as criminal "every person known to be a pickpocket, thief
• . . having no visible or lawful means of support, when found
loitering around any . . . railroad depot . . . is a vagrant ... ."9s In
order to sustain the validity of the statute, the court was forced
to conclude that "as proscribed by the statute the word 'loiter' ob-
viously connotes lingering in the designated places for the purpose
of committing a crime .... ": In a strongly worded dissent, Peters,
J., said:
The statute does not require that any type of suspicious
or sinister conduct be connected with the loitering.
Thus the statute purports to punish a person as a
criminal simply because of his status, an early com-
. .95 Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 319, 91 N.E.2d 666, 667 (1950).
96 Supra note 94, at 241, 363 P.2d at 665.
97 14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305 (1961).
9S California Penal Code § 647 (4).
99 Supra note 97 at 291, 363 P.2d at 307.
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mon-law concept that has long been repudiated in all
enlightened jurisdictions ....
The word "loitering" has no such sinister meaning
.... The majority, in an attempt to save the statute,
have simply rewritten it by inserting the element that
the loitering must be so connected with other conduct
that it indicates that the loiterer is lingering in the pro-
hibited area for the purpose of committing a crime ....
[U]nder the guise of interpretation, the court has
no power to rewrite the law by inserting therein a pro-
vision not found in the enactment, or to fill a gap
in a statute by adding a provision that the Legislature,
by oversight or design, omitted.10 0
It is submitted that the same comment might well apply to the
Dominguez case in Colorado. It is interesting to note that, ex-
cept as mentioned above, the Colorado court does not discuss the
ramifications of the "without lawful business and failing to give
satisfactory account" clauses, nor does the court mention the
possible objection that a single act is not sufficient to constitute
one a vagrant. In short, there is no discussion of the vagrancy
concept at all.
The troublesome aspect of cases like Dominguez is that usually
there is a subconscious feeling that the defendant either had com-
mitted or was about to commit some offense. The question remains,
however, do we, in the name of the police power and regulatory
measures, wish to shrug off the fact that we are knowingly con-
victing people of crimes other than those which we suspect them
of committing, under ordinances which are at best vague and un-
certain? Is our ability to make rational, clearly stated laws so
limited and unsophisticated that at the lower end of the spectrum
of crimnal offenses we cannot convict offenders of the proper
offenses?
B. Equal Protection of the Law
Another constitutional objection which could be raised in
vagrancy cases is that the legislation itself denies persons within the
class equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 10 1 It is said that this mandate "requires that state
legislation (criminal or civil), when it undertakes to make class-
ifications between people and subjects, makes reasonable class-
ifications .. .unreasonable classifications violate the general con-
cept of due process as well as the more specific notion of equal
protection. ' 10 2 The Supreme Court of the United States has ex-
pressed itself thusly:
The purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person with-
in the State's jurisdiction against intentional and ar-
bitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express
100 Id. at 293-4, 363 P.2d at 309-10.
101 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "Nor shall any stale . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."




terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents.
10 3
The troublesome area of the notion of equal protection of the
laws centers around what is a "reasonable" classification. "[T]o
define a class is simply to designate a quality or characteristic or
trait or relation, or any combination of these, the possession of
which, by an individual, determines his membership in or inclusion
within a class. '10 4 "A reasonable classification is one which includes
all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law." 10 5 Tussman and tenBroek advance an interesting test
for ascertaining the "reasonableness" of any piece of class legisla-
tion in an article published in 1949.
[W] e are ...dealing with the relation of two classes
to each other. The first class consists of all individuals
possessing the defining Trait; the second class consists
of all individuals possessing, or rather, tainted by, the
Mischief at which the law aims. The former is the
legislative classification; the latter is the class of those
similarly situated with respect to the law.
The first class (T below) consists of all individuals
possessing the defining Trait; the second class (M
below) . . .of all possessing, or rather, tainted by, the
Mischief at which the law aims ....
[T]he five possible relationships ... [are:]
(1) . . . [reasonable] All T's are M's and all M's
are T's.
(2) ... [unreasonable] No T's are M's.
(3) . . . [under-inclusive] All T's are M's but some
M's are not T's.
(4) . . . [over-inclusive] All M's are T's but some
T's are not M's.
(5) . . . [under-and over-inclusive] Some T's are
M's; some T's are not M's; and some M's are not T's.
One of these five relationships holds in fact in any
case of legislative classification .... 106
If one substitutes "vagrants" for the first class, T, membership
in the class being attained through conduct legislatively denounced
as vagrant, and "future criminals"'1 7 for the second class, M, the
object of the legislative purpose, the unreasonableness of vagrancy
legislation receives some statistical verification.0s
Vagrancy statutes fall into the fifth category; i.e., some vag-
rants are future criminals; some vagrants are not future criminals;
and some fuure criminals are not vagrants. It is the over-inclusive
aspect of these statutes which renders them "unreasonable," and
therefore unconstitutional. 'Granting that some vagrants are future
103 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918).
104 Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344 (1949).105 Id. at 346.
106 Id. at 347-53. See also Beall v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765 (Municipal Ct. D. C. 1951),
rev'd 201 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952); City of Portland v. Goadwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949).
107 For a judicial pronouncement that "future criminality" is the rationale behind vagrancy legis-
lation see District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947); State v. Gaynar, 119
N.J.L. 502, 197 Atl. 360, 363 (1938).
108 The author wishes to acknowledge that the idea of applying this test, formulated by Tussman
and tenBroek, to vagrancy type legislation is not original with him. The application of this ap-
proach was found in Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status
Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102 (1962).
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criminals, some are not, and undoubtedly a great many future
criminals are not, and never have been, vagrants. By reaching out
and including individuals who will never be future criminals, the
argument goes, the statutes over-step the bounds of reasonable class
legislation.
One fundamental objection to this sophisticated attack on
vagrancy legislation lies in the fact that future criminality is not
the only harm from which society seeks protection. That is, the
vagrant "as a future probable criminal" is not the only justification
behind the laws. If it were, the argument above would have much
more force, but it is submitted that the true rationale behind
vagrancy-type laws is the concept of giving the police regulatory
powers with which to maintain order, preserve the peace, and
regulate the conduct of those members of our society who tread
the borderline between right and wrong, without ever engaging
in more serious offenses.
It is because of the nature of the offenses involved, the caliber
of persons who engage in this type of conduct, and society's at-
tempts to deal with these problems that so much has been written
and so many constitutional attacks leveled against the vagrancy
concept. It is because the solution, heretofore, has been to give to
the police nebulous and ill-defined statutes which govern their
conduct in his area in the hopes that they will apply the law
reasonably and fairly, and our consequent disappointment when
we find that such is not the case, that so many persons have cried
out against this type of law. We have given the police the residual
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you will, that a suitable wardrobe
makes him feel better, more confident,
more like himself-and, most important,
makes him feel at home whatever busi-
ness or social occasion arises. He wears
the confident look . . . he wears a Kup-
penheimer. Suits from 110.00 to 125.00
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power to control low-level crimes, but find that they use this
power for many purposes other than those for which the power
was given. Among the other uses are the arrests on suspicion,
justifying false arrests and illegal searches and seizures, and others
enumerated earlier in this article.
In defense of the police it must be said that we expect them
to enforce the law, apprehend criminals, and maintain law and
order. The public is angered when they feel the police are not doing
an adequate job. The police feel they are entitled to use every
legal and authorized weapon at their disposal to effectively appre-
hend criminals and discharge their responsibility to the public.
Understaffed, underpaid and deluged with a rapidly growing
crime rate, it is utopian to expect the police to voluntarily give up
one of their prime weapons in the fight. Nor is it logical to expect
them to. We must make that decision. It is the public, speaking
through its duly constituted bodies, be they legislatures or city
councils, who set the limits and establish the framework under
which the police must operate. Due process of law is a cherished
concept, but it must extend to everyone in our society. "Official
illegality is quite as reprehensible as private violations of the law.
The law of the land must be accepted by everyone as the only rule
which can be allowed to govern the liberties of citizens, whatever
may be their ill desert."'u 9
[T] he time is surely at hand to modernize the vag-
rancy concept or, better yet, to abandon it altogether
for statutes which will harmonize with notions of a
decent, fair and just administration of criminal justice
and which will at the same time make it possible for
police departments to discharge their responsibilities
in a straightforward manner without the evasions and
hypocrisies which so many of our procedural rules
force upon them. 110
V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
If one were to view objectively the entire gamut of proscribed
criminal activity it would be possible, with fair accuracy, to evalu-
ate the enumerated offenses and to equate the degree of social harm
involved with the severity of the punishment to be meted out. The
continuum might start with the most heinous crimes, murder,
rape, etc., and descend slowly until the level of petty police regula-
tions was reached. At the upper end of the scale, and indeed,
throughout most of it, our society has constructed procedural safe-
guards which attempt to assure that the individual will not be
unjustly accused, tried, or convicted. But, when we reach the lower
end of the scale, we find that these safeguards have disappeared.
Gone are the traditional elements of a crime, mens rea and actus
reus. Gone is the presumption of innocence. Gone is the right to
personal freedom. In their place stand legislative enactments and
ordinances which purport to punish individuals for "being" a cer-
tain type of person rather than for "doing" a certain act. These en-
109 In the matter of Sarah May, 41 Mich. 90, 1 N.W. 1021, 1024 (1879).
110 Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues, and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 Calif. L. Rev.
557, 567 (1960).
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actments, in large part, are couched in terms so vague and ill-de-
fined that it is doubtful whether they would meet traditional con-
stitutional standards of clearness and unambiguity if the same lan-
guage were applied to any more serious offense.
Additionally, we often find these enactments are not even
used for the purposes for which they were designed, but rather
as a residual supplementary tool for the local police to arrest and
detain suspected persons, or to justify an otherwise illegal arrest.
We must realistically face this situation and ask ourselves whether,
in the name of criminal administration, we are prepared to deny
the protection of the Constitution to certain elements in our society
because they are a certain kind of person, or whether the true test
of "equality before the law" means that the constitutional safe-
guards are available to the lowest "bum" as well as to the average
citizen.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In
a government of laws, existence of the government
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously . . . .If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law an end justifies the means - to declare that the
government may commit -crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible
retribution. (Emphasis added.)"'
It is suggested here that Denver's Vagrancy Ordinance 1 2 can
be subdivided into different categories according to the type of
"offense" involved, and that such a subdivision would still allow
the police to effectively enforce the law and, at the same time,
overcome the constitutional objections to the vagrancy concept.
Considering first the type of conduct related to the common-law
notion of vagrancy, i.e., the "idle wanderer,"' an initial point of
inquiry ought to be whether individuals fitting these descriptions
are "criminals." That the community has a legitimate interest in
keeping itself from being overrun by a population of this nature
is not to be doubted. Currently, however, the police use the
varancy ordinances to conduct periodic round-ups of this class of
persons.1 4 Usually the police have no intention of prosecuting
many of them, but it is felt that by rounding them up, harassing
them, and convicting some, they will be discouraged from coming
out en masse and becoming a blight on the public consciousness.
It is at least doubtful whether this type of procedure curtails their
activity,115 but it is possible that a different type of proceeding,
111 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928), Brandeis, J., dissenting.
112 Denver, Colo. Rev. Municipal Code § 824 et. seq. (1958).
113 Id. at §§ 824.1-1., .1-4., and .1-5.
114 See Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 24, 1963, p. 8, col. 4.
115 See The Denver Post, March 1, 1963, p. 15, col. 1. In a letter from W. K. Reeser, police patrol
division chief, to Joseph P. Little, president of the Downtown Denver Improvement Ass'n, Chief
Reeser said the department did not believe that repeated apprehensions and jailing of drunks did much
toward solving the problem of undesirables loitering on the streets. Furthermore, the Denver Police
arrest up to 80% more drunks than other cities of comparable size, and this indicates that appre-
hension and initial incarceration are not solving the problem.
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perhaps civil in nature, would achieve better results. It might be
feasible to apply the term "vagrant" as a non-substantive appella-
tion, but require the individual to submit to civil care, custody,
and perhaps treatment. Since it is well known that most of the
individuals within this category are chronic alcoholics, the writer
would especially like to see the class of persons presently enumer-
ated under Section 824.1-6. (including .1-12) encompassed within
this category, particularly if care, custody, and treatment is avail-
able. This may be a mandatory provision in view of a recent
United States Supreme Court case, Robinson v. State of Cali-
fornia,116 where the defendant was convicted of the violation of a
statute making it a criminal offense for a person to be addicted to
the use of narcotics.11 7 The trial court, in its instructions to the
jury, stated: "that portion of the statute referring to 'addicted to
the use' of narcotics is based upon a condition or status." ' Mr.
Justice Stewart is delivering the opinion of the Court said:
A state might impose criminal sanctions, for example,
against the unauthorized sale, purchase, or possession
of narcotics within its borders. In the interest of dis-
couraging the violation of such laws .. .a state might
establish a program of compulsory treatment for those
addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment
might require periods of involuntary confinement.
And penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to
comply with established compulsory treatment pro-
cedures.1"!
Mr. Justice Stewart went on to say:
This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a
person for the use of narcotics . . . or for antisocial
or disorderly behavior resulting from their administra-
tion. It is not a law which even purports to provide
or require medical treatment. Rather, we deal with a
statute which makes the "status" of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense ....
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a
person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted
with a venereal disease. A State might determine that
the general health and welfare required that the vic-
tims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with
by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, con-
finement, or sequestration. But, in the light of con-
temporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments ..
116 370 U.S. 660, 82 Sup. Ct. 1417 (1962).
11T California Health and Safety Code § 11721: "No person shall use, or be under the influence
of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics ....
118 Supra note 116, at 662, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1418.
119 Id. at 664-5, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1419.
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[C]ounsel for the State recognized that narcotic ad-
diction is an illness .... 120 We hold that a state law
which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal
• . . inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
121
It is submitted that Section 824.1-6. (including .1-12) of the
Denver Code purports to punish any person who has attained the
status of being a "common drunkard" when found in an estab-
lishment where liquors are sold. "Common drunkard" is a term
which connotes to the average mind an "alcoholic," and alcoholism
is generally recognized today as being a disease of the mind and
body. Under the holding in the Robinson case, whereby it is un-
constitutional to punish as criminal those persons having the status
of being afflicted with a disease, and the recognition that alcoholism
is a disease, there is a strong possibility that the portion of the
Denver Code purporting to punish "common drunkards" is un-
constitutional.
By grouping together idle wanderers and common drunks (and
possibly drug addicts) the community would be able to reach those
individuals and assert control over their conduct by civil procedures
designed for remedial, rehabilitative methods rather than by re-
sorting to the expedient of prosecuting them as criminals. It is
felt that in the long run this would prove more beneficial to the
community and the individual than the present system of harass-
ment, confinement and no rehabilitation.
120 Id. at 666-7, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1420, n.8: "In its brief appellee stated: 'Of course it is generally
conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of
mental and physical illness. So is an alcoholic.' " (Emphasis supplied.)
121 Id. at 667, 82 Sup. Ct. at 1420-21.
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Turning to the second class of individuals presently encom-
passed within the vagrancy ordinance, '1 2 2 we find that, with only
one exception, every offense enumerated therein bears a specific
relationship to a substantive offense punished elsewhere in the
Code.' 3 They are all properly classified as petty offenses, but not
all of them require a repetition of the same conduct to bring the
offense within the ambit of the vagrancy concept as currently
used. It is suggested that, if the community feels conduct of the
enumerated types is serious enough to warrant specific prohibitions,
then a repetition of that conduct may logically raise the inference
that it is habitual. The question is, however, why leave the problem
to inference? If repetitious conduct of the types specified is deemed
more socially harmful than an isolated instance of misconduct, and
if a more severe sanction is to be imposed, let us impose standards
capable of rational proof, as we do in prostitution and pimping, such
as three prior convictions in the previous two year period.
It is proposed that a new section of the Code could be added
entitled the "Habitual Petty Offender" act which, at the lower end
of the criminal scale, would be analagous to the "Habitual Criminal
Act' 'r '4 operative at the other end of the scale. This, in effect, would
require the police to make arrests initially for the substantive of-
fense involved wih all the attendant constitutional safeguards. Only
after repeated convictions would this new act, imposing a greater
sentence, be brought into play. In this way, hopefully, many of the
hypocrisies and underhanded methods presently employed in the
name of police regulations could be eliminated.
Turning to the remaining two sections of the Code not previous-
ly covered,'2 5 it is recommended that they be eliminated entirely.
Section .1-7., discussed earlier in this paper, is nothing less than
an invitation to the police to arrest on suspicion, no matter how
slight. It gives to the officer a practically unlimited discretion to
invoke the criminal process with little or no guides except his
own appraisal of the situation. Its broad sweep and fundamental
ambiguity renders it obnoxious to enlightened criminal theory, and
in the interests of justice it should be entirely eliminated.
It is undoubtedly necessary to give the police some residual
power to prevent crime in its inception and to apprehend persons
who, in the police officer's discretion, are seeking the opportunity
to commit a crime. To give the police this power it is offered as a
suggestion that Colorado adopt the Uniform Arrest Act, '26 the
pertinent parts of which are:
Section 2. Questioning and Detaining Suspects.
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who
he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may
122 Supra note 117, §§ 824.1-2., .1-3., .1-8., .1-9., 11. .1-11A., and .7-11B.
123 Section 824.1-9., relating to fortune tellers and palmistry, does not appear elsewhere in the
Code.
124 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-13-1 (1953). Punishment for habitual criminals - Every person convicted
in this state of any felony who shall have been previously twice convicted upon charges separately
brought and tried . . . o a felony .. . shall be adjudged an habitual criminal and shall be pun-
ished by confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than the longest term, or more
than three times the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction.
Every person convicted in this stoe of any felony, who shall have previously three times been
convicted . . . of a felony . . . shall be adjudged an habitual criminal and shall be punished by
imprisonment . . for . .. life ....
125 Sections 824.1-7. and .1-10.
126 Set forth in full with comments in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942).
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demand of him his name, address, business abroad and
whither he is going.
(2) Any person who fails to identify himself or ex-
plain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may
be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this
section shall not exceed two hours. The detention is
not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in
any official record. At the end of the detention the
person so detained shall be released or be arrested and
charged with a crime.
127
It is submitted that in this fashion the police could accomplish
their objective of preventing crime by lawful methods, without
resorting to unconstitutional arrests or the fiction that the arrest
may be justified by charging the person with vagrancy.
Section .1-10., which purports to punish "any person who keeps
a place where lost or stolen property is concealed, ' 128 is so vague
in terms that it is difficult to conceive of it withstanding a serious
constitutional attack. It would seem, in effect, to impose strict crim-
inal liability on one who falls within its ambit, without regard to
knowledge, wilfullness, innocence, or any other standard capable
of rational interpretation. For the above reasons, it too should be
dispensed with.
This article has been an attempt to bring some order out of
the chaos inherent in the vagrancy concept as applied in modern
legislation. The fact that the public and the police are apathetic
towards the constitutional infringements which are a daily part
of the lives of some of our citizens is no excuse for not attempting to
rectify the abuses. "The criminal law is one of the many inter-
twined mechanisms for the social control of human behavior.
129 It
is "but a piece in the mosaic of social controls."' 3 0 It is the author's
belief that a society can best be judged not by how it exerts
its controls on the upper echelon of its members, but by how far
down the social scale the standards extend. To give the serious
offender full constitutional protection but deny such protection
to the petty offender is not only unjust and unwarranted, but is
a blight upon our cherished theory of equality before the law.
127 Id. at 344.
128 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 824.1-10.
129 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions In the
Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 544 (1960).
13.0 Id. at 544 n. 3.
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